Introduction

I thank the British Institute of International and Comparative Law very warmly for inviting me
to deliver the Grotius Lecture in this anniversary year. Over the last 60 years, the Institute has been a vital force in the legal life of this country. It has been immensely successful in promoting international law and comparative law and, thereby, the rule of law itself. So it is a particular honour to be invited to deliver this lecture this evening.
2018 also marks another anniversary -the fortieth anniversary of the enactment of the State Immunity Act 1978 -and it occurred to me that this might be an appropriate occasion on which to take stock of some of the principal changes in the field of international law and foreign relations law since 1978 which have impinged on its operation. The statute itself is, of course, a huge subject which has been addressed with great distinction by a number of writers -in particular by Lady Fox and Dr. Webb in their magisterial work on state immunity 2 . To undertake a comprehensive study of the first 40 years of the Act would require a course of lectures. You will be relieved to learn that I do not propose to engage in a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions. What I shall attempt this evening is to identify certain themes, certain milestones along the road, and in particular to address various ways in which the statute has been applied, modified and supplemented by judicial decisions.
The need for a State Immunity Act
1 I am very grateful to my judicial assistants Ewan McCaig and Courtney Grafton for their assistance in the preparation of this lecture and to Professor Eirik Bjorge for his comments. 2 Fox and Webb, The Law of State Immunity, 3 rd Ed., revised (2015) .
By 1978 the need for legislation in the United Kingdom to reform the law of state immunity was obvious and urgent.
The common law in this jurisdiction had proceeded on the basis that foreign sovereigns enjoyed a near absolute immunity from actions in personam -there were very limited exceptions in respect of immovable property in this jurisdiction and trust funds administered by the court -and it also adhered to an absolute immunity in Admiralty actions in rem. No distinction was drawn between sovereign and non-sovereign activities of States. The Supreme Court in Benkharbouche has now explained that this was largely founded on an erroneous view of international law which never warranted immunity extending beyond what sovereigns did in their capacity as such. 3 Nevertheless, absolute immunity had found favour with the highest courts in this jurisdiction including the House of Lords in The Cristina 4 in 1938.
In the years following the Second World War, however, the trend of the decisions of courts in many other jurisdictions and of academic writings was, as a result of the massively increased involvement of State trading enterprises in international trade, moving towards a more restrictive theory which limited immunity to cases where the subject matter of the dispute was a sovereign activity. In 1952 in the Tate letter the US State Department had decided to favour restrictive immunity and that line was then taken up by the US Federal courts 5 . In Europe, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht adopted a restrictive immunity founded on the juridical character of the conduct in question, in Claim against the Empire of Iran in 1963 6 . Thereafter the general trend world-wide was away from absolute immunity.
In this jurisdiction, in the 1970s, the judges showed themselves willing to adapt to these changed conditions. In November 1975 in The Philippine Admiral 7 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from Hong Kong was concerned with an action in rem against a vessel engaged in ordinary commercial trading owned by the Reparations Commission, an agency of the Republic of the Philippines. The underlying claims were entirely commercial. The Board concluded that it was wrong in principle to accord immunity in an action in rem where the vessel was engaged in ordinary trading activities. 8 The only reason, their Lordships considered, for granting immunity was that to apply the restrictive theory to actions in rem while continuing to apply the absolute theory to actions in personam would be illogical. However, they were not deterred by that although they added in relation to the continuing absolute immunity to actions in personam:
"It is no doubt open to the House of Lords to decide otherwise but it may fairly be said to be at the least unlikely that it would do so…" 9 However, Lord Denning was made of sterner stuff and shortly thereafter in Trendtex v. Central
Bank of Nigeria 10 the Court of Appeal denied immunity to the Bank when it was sued on a commercial letter of credit. Lord Denning considered that there was no international consensus on the scope of State immunity. As a result, it was open to the courts of this country to define the rule as best they could, seeking guidance from the decisions of courts of other countries, from jurists, from conventions and by defining the rule in terms which are consonant with justice rather than adverse to it.
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The end of the story of the judicial reform of state immunity comes only after the enactment of the State Immunity Act. In May 1981 in I Congreso del Partido 12 -a pre-Act case decided on common law principles -the House of Lords accepted that actions, whether commenced in rem or in personam were to be decided in accordance with the restrictive theory. Lord Wilberforce formulated the appropriate approach in the following terms:
"The conclusion which emerges is that in considering, under the restrictive theory, whether state immunity should be granted or not, the court must consider the whole context in which the claim against the state is made, with a view to deciding whether the relevant act(s) upon which the claim is based should, in that context, be considered as fairly within an area of activity, trading or commercial or otherwise of a private law character, in which the state has chosen to engage or whether the relevant act(s) should be considered as having been done outside that area and within the sphere of governmental or sovereign activity." More recently, immunity has also been extended to an official of a separate entity by an expansive interpretation of section 14(2) of the Act.
25
The approach of the Court of Appeal in Propend v. Sing has been criticised by some writers.
26
First, it is said that the employee or agent qua State would arguably be able to waive his own immunity by submitting to the jurisdiction in accordance with section 2 of the Act. It seems to me, however, that there is no inconsistency between accepting that in certain circumstances the immunity may extend to an individual acting as an organ or agent of a State, and maintaining that the immunity is the State's immunity which can be waived only by representatives of the State with authority to do so. 27 Secondly, it is suggested that the requirement that the employee or agent has acted in the exercise of sovereign authority places an unwarranted gloss on the State's immunity which should be judged by the principles in sections 1 to 11 of the Act and not according to customary international law. I would accept that this approach does import a requirement which otherwise does not apply to a State but only to a separate entity under the scheme of Part I. However, such a requirement is to my mind appropriate in defining the scope of the immunity ratione materiae whether of an individual or a separate entity. Moreover, the concept of "the exercise of sovereign authority" is employed elsewhere in Part I of the Act in the definition of "commercial transaction" in section 3(3). In any event, the gloss is, to my mind, justified in order to give effect to the statutory scheme as a whole. Finally, it is suggested that a better approach would have been to hold that proceedings against a State agent or employee indirectly implead the State. It seems to me, however, that that approach is itself highly problematical -a matter to which I shall return.
The final seal of approval was set on this development in the law of the United Kingdom by the House of Lords in Jones v. Saudi Arabia. 28 In that case three of the claimants sought to recover, inter alia, aggravated damages for assault and negligence at the hands of four named individuals:
two police officers, the deputy governor of the prison where they were held and the head of the Does it make any difference which approach is adopted? In many cases it does not 60 . The
Strasbourg approach gives effect to international law rules on State immunity but takes account of them at a later stage in the analysis by addressing them through the prism of Article 6.
In Benkharbouche the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there was no rule of international law which required the grant of immunity in Embassy employment disputes in the circumstances of the two cases before the court. The point was clearly made, moreover, by Lord Sumption 61 that this is not a situation in which the UK court, considering the international law obligations of the United Kingdom, may properly limit itself to asking whether the United Kingdom has acted on a tenable view of those obligations. This is not, for example, a case where the rationality of a public authority's view of a point of international law may depend on whether it was tenable rather than whether it was right. 62 cogens from which no derogation is permitted. Within the hierarchy of rules of international law, such rules of jus cogens are superior and should prevail over lesser rules which are not jus cogens. As a result, the rule prohibiting torture should prevail over any rule which would grant immunity before national courts to a State engaging in torture or to an individual engaging in torture on behalf of a State. It is essentially a trumping argument: the higher status of the rule prohibiting torture trumps any rule conferring immunity.
It is superficially an attractive argument and would lead to a result which many would see as desirable -the withdrawal of immunity from State torturers. However, the argument suffers from two grave defects and the House of Lords in Jones v. Saudi Arabia was right to reject it.
First, it is based on fallacious reasoning. Secondly, State practice does not support any such development in customary international law. Nevertheless, it was for a time, a highly influential argument.
It is no doubt correct that the prohibition on torture has achieved the status of a rule of jus cogens. I have already touched on the reasoning of the majority. They considered that Article 6 was engaged but that a measure which reflected generally recognised rules of international law on state immunity could not be a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a court under Article 6(1). In coming to that conclusion, the majority accepted that Furundzija and Pinochet demonstrated that the prohibition of torture had become a peremptory rule of international law.
That was recognised by the House of Lords in
However, they distinguished those cases on the ground that they were concerned with criminal liability whereas the case before them concerned civil liability. The majority was unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials before it any firm basis for What a pity! The Court, whose task in this case was to rule whether there had been a violation of Article 6(1), had a golden opportunity to issue a clear and forceful condemnation of all acts of torture.
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The decision of the majority is, to my mind, while correct in the result, flawed by its reliance on a distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. As the minority was quick to point out, it is not the nature of the proceedings which determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has upon another rule of international law. The real point here is not that the status of the rule prohibiting torture as a rule of jus cogens overrides immunity only in criminal cases but that it does not have the effect of overriding immunity at all. The Al-Adsani case was not concerned with the substantive prohibition on torture but with the distinct question as to which courts had jurisdiction to hear cases concerning it. The jus cogens status of the prohibition on torture was irrelevant so far as that was concerned.
The which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. 85 Similarly, it rejected an argument that to allow immunity in these circumstances would hinder the enforcement of a jus cogens rule. 86 The rules which determine the scope and extent of jurisdiction and when that jurisdiction may be exercised do not derogate from those substantive rules which possess jus cogens status, nor is there anything inherent in the concept of jus cogens which would require their modification or which would displace their application.
So State immunity and non-justiciability.
Standing back from these developments, it appears that there has been a change of emphasis in the law of State immunity which is apparent in various ways. The move to a restricted principle of State immunity in this jurisdiction necessarily involved a shift of focus. If you have an absolute principle of immunity, the focus is necessarily on the identity of the defendant or the party indirectly impleaded. However, once you accept restrictions on immunity, the subject matter of the proceedings moves to centre stage and requires close scrutiny. Similarly, as we have seen, in a parallel development it has come to be accepted in this jurisdiction that individuals performing official functions of a foreign State may be entitled to immunity, with the result that the focus there too is not on the identity of the defendant but the nature of the activity. 95 As a result the terms "immunity ratione personae" and "immunity ratione materiae", relating respectively to status-based immunity and conduct-based immunity, have entered common legal usage in this jurisdiction.
In These are, of course, distinct principles. State immunity is a principle of customary international law. It derives from the principle of the sovereign equality and independence of States in international law. 102 Although its precise scope is often the subject of uncertainty or dispute,
where it applies it is a principle with which States are required to comply. The act of foreign state principle, by contrast -although it also has its roots in notions of the independence and sovereignty of states -is not a principle of customary international law 103 and many States have no such rule. As Lord Sumption observed in Belhaj, the foreign act of state doctrine is at best permitted by international law. It is not based upon it. 104 The foreign act of state principle is clearly a portmanteau concept. It now seems that it includes three or possibly four different principles: the Supreme Court was not in total agreement on this point. First, there will be many situations in which the application of established rules of private international law -the conflict of laws -will provide a complete answer and it will not be necessary to have regard to any wider principle of act of state. Secondly, there is authority -at least up to the level of the Court of Appeal -for a principle of act of state whereby the court will not inquire into the legality of an act of a foreign government within its own territory. 105 The majority view in Belhaj v. Straw was that, if it exists, this category is limited to acts in relation to property and does not extend to personal torts. Moreover, this second category is clearly subject justiciability still remains to be worked out. This, in my view, is a process particularly suitable for incremental development and clarification by judicial decision. If this is right, it provides a further contrast with state immunity where, forty years ago, the State Immunity Act was urgently required in order to effect a wholesale reform of the law in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the State Immunity Act has enabled the courts to give effect to a restricted principle of state immunity in accordance with the requirements of international law. It has provided a clear structure which has enabled litigants to know where they stand and has, as a result, promoted certainty in this area of the law where it was much needed. At the same time, it has shown itself adaptable to changing conditions and the judges have made an important contribution by a process of judicial interpretation -in particular in relation to the immunity of State agents.
Conclusion
As the State Immunity Act enters early middle age, I think it is worth recording that, in general, it has stood the test of time reasonably well. 
